After all, if conscious mental states are simply identical to brain states, then there may simply be a “brute fact” that really does not need any further explaining. [6] There might be different levels or orders of consciousness,[7] or different kinds of consciousness, or just one kind with different features. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” In, Van Gulick, R. “Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental.” In. Such a sense, no doubt, continues to fuel the related anti-materialist intuitions raised in the previous section. An experience or other mental entity is 'phenomenally conscious' just in case there is 'something it is like' for one to have it. It might seem that the HOT theory results in circularity by defining consciousness in terms of HOTs. The basic idea is that consciousness arises through quantum effects which occur in subcellular neural structures known as microtubules, which are structural proteins in cell walls. Cheap essay writing sercice. There is substantial evidence that a "top-down" flow of neural activity (i.e., activity propagating from the frontal cortex to sensory areas) is more predictive of conscious awareness than a "bottom-up" flow of activity. Searle’s larger argument, however, is that one cannot get semantics (meaning) from syntax (formal symbol manipulation). On a related front, some materialists are happy enough to talk about a somewhat weaker “supervenience” relation between mind and matter. Presumably, McGinn would say that we are not capable of putting such a theory together in any appropriate way. The first is simply the issue of just how does or could such radically different substances causally interact. A common theme is that there is a principled difference in the objects of the HO states in question. Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is understood intuitively by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in defining it. University of Southern Indiana What makes a mental state be a conscious mental state? Science will be able, in principle, to close the gap and solve the hard problem of consciousness in an analogous way that we now have a very good understanding for why “water is H2O” or “heat is mean molecular kinetic energy” that was lacking centuries ago. Even most dualists can accept such interpretations. [41] He suggested that the interaction between these two domains occurs inside the brain, perhaps in a small midline structure called the pineal gland. Patients may suffer from disorders of consciousness or may need to be anesthetized for a surgical procedure. The Pemose-Hameroff “Orch OR” Model of Consciousness.” In. However, when one looks at how the brain processes information, one only sees discrete regions of the cortex processing separate aspects of perceptual objects. Many other neuroscientists, such as Christof Koch,[49] have explored the neural basis of consciousness without attempting to frame all-encompassing global theories. (But for more recent defenses of type-type identity theory see Hill and McLaughlin 1999, Papineau 1994, 1995, 1998, Polger 2004.) [90] Daniel Dennett has argued for an approach he calls heterophenomenology, which means treating verbal reports as stories that may or may not be true, but his ideas about how to do this have not been widely adopted. If evolutionary processes are blind to the difference between function F being performed by conscious organism O and non-conscious organism O*, it is unclear what adaptive advantage consciousness could provide. A great deal is known about low-level signal processing in sensory systems. On the other hand, we humans obviously do have some grasp on consciousness and on the workings of the brain — just see the references at the end of this entry! For instance, the suggestion by Crick and Koch that layer 5 neurons of the mammalian brain have a special role, seems difficult to apply to the avian brain, since the avian homologues have a different morphology. Cheap essay writing sercice. For example, if the HO theorist takes the option that the resulting conscious experience is reddish, then it seems that the HO state plays no role in determining the qualitative character of the experience. A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e., a mental state directed at another mental state. Understanding the physical basis of qualities, such as redness or pain, has been particularly challenging. The rationale for such a comparative study is that the avian brain deviates structurally from the mammalian brain. Edelman also differentiates between what he calls primary consciousness (which is a trait shared by humans and non-human animals) and higher-order consciousness as it appears in humans alone along with human language capacity. Thus, to say that the mind is non-physical is to say something much stronger than that it is non-material. [172] A similar concept appears in Buddhist philosophy, expressed by the Sanskrit term Citta-saṃtāna, which is usually translated as mindstream or "mental continuum". Interactionist Dualism or simply “interactionism” is the most common form of “substance dualism” and its name derives from the widely accepted fact that mental states and bodily states causally interact with each other. [17] In short, it is difficult to see just how Tye’s PANIC account might not equally apply to unconscious representations and thus how it really explains phenomenal consciousness. He calls such states “HOGS” (Higher-Order Global States) whereby a lower-order unconscious state is “recruited” into a larger state, which becomes conscious partly due to the implicit self-awareness that one is in the lower-order state. There are now several important journals devoted entirely to the study of consciousness: Consciousness and Cognition, Journal of Consciousness Studies, and Psyche. The former is very much in line with the Nagelian notion described above. Most generally, however, we can say that a representationalist will typically hold that the phenomenal properties of experience (that is, the “qualia” or “what it is like of experience” or “phenomenal character”) can be explained in terms of the experiences’ representational properties. Third, as we saw earlier (3b.i), there may be a very good reason why such zombie scenarios seem possible; namely, that we do not (at least, not yet) see what the necessary connection is between neural events and conscious mental events. What is religion? (See also Lurz 2003 and 2004 for yet another interesting hybrid account.). These and other NCCs are explored at length in Metzinger (2000). Two final areas of interest involve animal and machine consciousness. Some of the credit must go to the ground breaking 1986 book by Patricia Churchland entitled Neurophilosophy. At the present time many scientists and philosophers consider the arguments for an important role of quantum phenomena to be unconvincing.[53]. You can be rest assurred that through our service we will write the best admission essay for you. When I am in a conscious mental state, there is “something it is like” for me to be in that state from the subjective or first-person point of view. “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.” In. On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases, so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality. Puberty signals the beginning of adolescence, and puberty now occurs earlier. [22] Here, conscientia is the knowledge that a witness has of the deed of someone else. If awareness of awareness is required, then it is doubtful whether the great apes and human infants are conscious.[31]. [37] Some philosophers have argued that it is intrinsically unsolvable, because qualities ("qualia") are ineffable; that is, they are "raw feels", incapable of being analyzed into component processes. These phenomena raise a number of important philosophical questions and have forced philosophers to rethink some very basic assumptions about the nature of mind and consciousness. [142], Phenomenology is a method of inquiry that attempts to examine the structure of consciousness in its own right, putting aside problems regarding the relationship of consciousness to the physical world. Although some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity of this distinction,[36] others have broadly accepted it. It is worth briefly noting a few typical objections to HO theories (many of which can be found in Byrne 1997): First, and perhaps most common, is that various animals (and even infants) are not likely to have to the conceptual sophistication required for HOTs, and so that would render animal (and infant) consciousness very unlikely (Dretske 1995, Seager 2004). Carruthers’ dispositional theory is often criticized by those who, among other things, do not see how the mere disposition toward a mental state can render it conscious (Rosenthal 2004; see also Gennaro 2004, 2012; for more, see Consciousness, Higher Order Theories of.). Although not concerned to reject the metaphysics of materialism, Levine gives eloquent expression to the idea that there is a key gap in our ability to explain the connection between phenomenal properties and brain properties (see also Levine 1993, 2001). Ongoing scientific investigation is significant and an important aspect of current scientific research in the field. (4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself. When I introspect that desire, however, I then have a conscious HOT (accompanied by a yet higher, third-order, HOT) directed at the desire itself (see Rosenthal 1986). The writings of such figures as Wilhelm Wundt (1897), William James (1890) and Alfred Titchener (1901) are good examples of this approach. For example, research on ideasthesia shows that qualia are organised into a semantic-like network. Another rich source of information comes from the provocative and accessible writings of neurologists on a whole host of psychopathologies, most notably Oliver Sacks (starting with his 1987 book) and, more recently, V. S. Ramachandran (2004; see also Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998). Thus, any examination of the evolution of consciousness is faced with great difficulties. “The Superiority of HOP to HOT.” In Gennaro 2004a. It also might seem that an infinite regress results because a conscious mental state must be accompanied by a HOT, which, in turn, must be accompanied by another HOT ad infinitum. In the 1970s Gordon Gallup developed an operational test for self-awareness, known as the mirror test. The earliest English language uses of "conscious" and "consciousness" date back, however, to the 1500s. The possibility of machine (or robot) consciousness has intrigued philosophers and non-philosophers alike for decades. Aside from the explicitly representational approaches discussed above, there are also related attempts to explain consciousness in other cognitive terms. If you need professional help with completing any kind of homework, AffordablePapers.com is the right place to get it. In essence, he says that computers or robots are just not made of the right stuff with the right kind of “causal powers” to produce genuine thought or consciousness. 2003 and Beckoff et. The basic idea is that if a machine could fool an interrogator (who could not see the machine) into thinking that it was human, then we should say it thinks or, at least, has intelligence. When the HOT is itself conscious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-order) thought directed at the second-order state. Although materialism may not logically rule out immortality or free will, materialists will likely often reply that such traditional, perhaps even outdated or pre-scientific beliefs simply ought to be rejected to the extent that they conflict with materialism. A number of key areas are under continuing investigation. [44], Since the dawn of Newtonian science with its vision of simple mechanical principles governing the entire universe, some philosophers have been tempted by the idea that consciousness could be explained in purely physical terms. Turing disavowed any interest in terminology, saying that even "Can machines think?" This is meant as analogous to past similar eliminations based on deeper scientific understanding, for example, we no longer need to speak of “ether” or “phlogiston.” Other eliminativists, more modestly, argue that there is no such thing as qualia when they are defined in certain problematic ways (Dennett 1988). In the late 20th century, philosophers like Hamlyn, Rorty, and Wilkes have disagreed with Kahn, Hardie and Modrak as to whether Aristotle even had a concept of consciousness. When I am in a conscious mental state, there is something it is like for me to be in that state from the subjective or first-person point of view. Meetings cost them more. Without probing into every aspect of PANIC theory, Tye holds that at least some of the representational content in question is non-conceptual (N), which is to say that the subject can lack the concept for the properties represented by the experience in question, such as an experience of a certain shade of red that one has never seen before. Signals arising from sensory organs are transmitted to the brain and then processed in a series of stages, which extract multiple types of information from the raw input. Objections to these cognitive theories include the charge that they do not really address the hard problem of consciousness (as described in section 3b.i), but only the “easy” problems. He, like Leibniz, also saw the need to postulate the existence of unconscious mental states and mechanisms in order to provide an adequate theory of mind (Kitcher 1990 and Brook 1994 are two excellent books on Kant’s theory of mind.). This might seem impossible but with our highly skilled professional writers all your custom essays, book reviews, research papers and other custom tasks you order with us will be of high quality. A fourth important objection to HO approaches is the question of how such theories can explain cases where the HO state might misrepresent the lower-order (LO) mental state (Byrne 1997, Neander 1998, Levine 2001, Block 2011). Although in the essay Du Bois used "double consciousness" to refer to at least three different [83] Starting in the 1980s, an expanding community of neuroscientists and psychologists have associated themselves with a field called Consciousness Studies, giving rise to a stream of experimental work published in books,[84] journals such as Consciousness and Cognition, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, Psyche, and the Journal of Consciousness Studies, along with regular conferences organized by groups such as the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness[85] and the Society for Consciousness Studies. There are actually several different kinds of property dualism, but what they have in common is the idea that conscious properties, such as the color qualia involved in a conscious experience of a visual perception, cannot be explained in purely physical terms and, thus, are not themselves to be identified with any brain state or process. To writers on spiritual or religious topics, it frequently connotes the relationship between the mind and God, or the relationship between the mind and deeper truths that are thought to be more fundamental than the physical world. “Telic Higher-Order Thoughts and Moore’s Paradox.” In, Kriegel, U. Although similar in some ways to representationalism, Dennett is most concerned that materialists avoid falling prey to what he calls the “myth of the Cartesian theater,” the notion that there is some privileged place in the brain where everything comes together to produce conscious experience. The two broad, traditional and competing theories of mind are dualism and materialism (or physicalism). No such explanation is forthcoming or is perhaps even possible, according to materialists. There are also many familiar objections to both materialism and dualism. “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” In, Kriegel, U. What are the neural correlates of consciousness? [131] Several scholars including Pinker, Chomsky, Edelman, and Luria have indicated the importance of the emergence of human language as an important regulative mechanism of learning and memory in the context of the development of higher-order consciousness (see Neural correlates section above). On the other hand, dualism faces the problem of explaining how a non-physical substance or mental state can causally interact with the physical body. Harman, G. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” In J. Tomberlin, ed. Stimulation to specific areas of the brain results in modality specific conscious experiences. The objects of the HO states must be “in the head.”. It is probably fair to say that HO theorists have been slow to address this problem, though a number of overlapping responses have emerged (see also Gennaro 2005, 2012, chapter four, for more extensive treatment). Rosenthal, D. M. “Thinking that one thinks.” In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. This article focuses on Western theories and conceptions of consciousness, especially as found in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. We write high quality term papers, sample essays, research papers, dissertations, thesis papers, assignments, book reviews, speeches, book reports, custom web content and business papers. Maybe the hard problem isn’t so hard after all – it will just take some more time. As a third issue, philosophers who dispute the validity of the Turing test may feel that it is possible, at least in principle, for verbal report to be dissociated from consciousness entirely: a philosophical zombie may give detailed verbal reports of awareness in the absence of any genuine awareness. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Whether you are looking for essay, coursework, research, or term paper help, or with any other assignments, it is no problem for us. What homologues can be identified? In psychology, phenomenology largely has meant attempting to investigate consciousness using the method of introspection, which means looking into one's own mind and reporting what one observes. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Darwinian revolution, it would seem that materialism is on even stronger ground provided that one accepts basic evolutionary theory and the notion that most animals are conscious. The brain mechanisms underlying these effects are not as well understood as those induced by use of alcohol,[138] but there is substantial evidence that alterations in the brain system that uses the chemical neurotransmitter serotonin play an essential role. The three main types of monism are physicalism (which holds that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way), idealism (which holds that only thought or experience truly exists, and matter is merely an illusion), and neutral monism (which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct essence that is itself identical to neither of them). However, this view historically came under serious assault due to the fact that it seems to rule out the so-called “multiple realizability” of conscious mental states. [117][118] Karl Popper develops in the book The Self and Its Brain a similar evolutionary argument. “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” In, Kriegel, U. The mystical psychiatrist Richard Maurice Bucke, author of the 1901 book Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind, It seems plausible to suppose that one is conscious (in some sense) of objects in one’s peripheral visual field even though one is only attending to some narrow (focal) set of objects within that visual field. In philosophy, phenomenology has largely been devoted to fundamental metaphysical questions, such as the nature of intentionality ("aboutness"). In R. Solso (Ed. The assumption, made by Rosenthal for example, about the extrinsic nature of the meta-thought has increasingly come under attack, and thus various hybrid representational theories can be found in the literature. [65] Other thinkers, such as Douglas Hofstadter, dismiss this argument as incoherent. [149] In computational neuroscience, Bayesian approaches to brain function have been used to understand both the evaluation of sensory information in light of previous experience, and the integration of information over time. [30] In The Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology (1989 edition), Stuart Sutherland expressed a skeptical attitude more than a definition: Consciousness—The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.” In, Kriegel, U. Any theory which attempts to explain consciousness in terms of higher-order states is known as a higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness. It is also interesting to think about Baars’ GWT in light of the Block’s distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness (see section 1). In his essay Turing discussed a variety of possible objections, and presented a counterargument to each of them. The structures assumed to be critical for consciousness in mammalian brains have homologous counterparts in avian brains. [91] Another issue with verbal report as a criterion is that it restricts the field of study to humans who have language: this approach cannot be used to study consciousness in other species, pre-linguistic children, or people with types of brain damage that impair language. An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world through its (echo-locatory) senses. Gennaro holds that conscious mental states should be understood (as Kant might have today) as global brain states which are combinations of passively received perceptual input and presupposed higher-order conceptual activity directed at that input. The classic notion at work is that consciousness or individual conscious mental states can be explained in terms of something else or in some other terms. However, he remains somewhat skeptical concluding "I don't know whether there are any actual cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness, but I hope I have illustrated their conceptual possibility." What to Write About in a Self Reflection Essay Recently, consciousness has also become a significant topic of interdisciplinary research in cognitive science, involving fields such as psychology, linguistics, anthropology,[11] neuropsychology and neuroscience. [93] The scientific literature regarding the neural bases of arousal and purposeful movement is very extensive. The general pattern of each argument is to assume that all the physical facts are known about some conscious mind or conscious experience. [43] However, no alternative solution has gained general acceptance. However, this test can be used only to detect, but not refute the existence of consciousness. [163], The more complex procedure is known as a neurological examination, and is usually carried out by a neurologist in a hospital setting. Thus, a full explanation of phenomenal consciousness does require more than a HO theory, but that is no objection to HO theories as such. Although “supervenience” is a highly technical notion with many variations, the idea is basically one of dependence (instead of identity); for example, that the mental depends on the physical in the sense that any mental change must be accompanied by some physical change (see Kim 1993). What makes a person the same person over time? It should be noted that there is also another less popular form of substance dualism called parallelism, which denies the causal interaction between the non-physical mental and physical bodily realms. This view simply holds that each particular conscious mental event in some organism is identical with some particular brain process or event in that organism. Once again, however, McGinn does not reject the metaphysics of materialism, but rather argues that we are “cognitively closed” with respect to this problem much like a rat or dog is cognitively incapable of solving, or even understanding, calculus problems. A detailed survey would be impossible to give here, but a number of other candidates for the NCC have emerged over the past two decades, including reentrant cortical feedback loops in the neural circuitry throughout the brain (Edelman 1989, Edelman and Tononi 2000), NMDA-mediated transient neural assemblies (Flohr 1995), and emotive somatosensory haemostatic processes in the frontal lobe (Damasio 1999). More specifically, philosophers will often call such representational mental states “intentional states” which have representational content; that is, mental states which are “about something” or “directed at something” as when one has a thought about the house or a perception of the tree. A related and increasingly popular version of representational theory holds that the meta-psychological state in question should be understood as intrinsic to (or part of) an overall complex conscious state. In contrast, we can also use various concepts couched in physical or neurophysiological terms to refer to that same mental state from the third-person point of view. For example, John Locke (1689/1975) once said that “consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind.” This intuition has been revived by a number of philosophers (Rosenthal, 1986, 1993b, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2005; Gennaro 1996a, 2012; Armstrong, 1968, 1981; Lycan, 1996, 2001). Edelman, G. & Tononi, G. “Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience.” In Metzinger 2000. Nonetheless, there is agreement among these authors that conscious mental states are, in some important sense, reflexive or self-directed. The problem of consciousness is arguably the most central issue in current philosophy of mind and is also importantly related to major traditional topics in metaphysics, such as the possibility of immortality and the belief in free will. (See Keenan et. “Sensations and Brain Processes.” In, Smith, D.W. “The Structure of (self-)consciousness.” In, Turing, A. The ontological distinction among the form, appearance, and substrate of an activity of consciousness is detailed in D. W. Smith, Mind World (2004), in the essay “Three Facets of Consciousness”. Rosenthal, D.M. Much of the debate centers on various alleged similarities or dissimilarities between the mind-brain and water-H2O cases (or other such scientific identities). Most specific theories of consciousness tend to be reductionist in some sense. Given that there is no “Cartesian theater” in the brain where all this information comes together, the problem arises as to just how the resulting conscious experience is unified. [147], In neuroscience, a great deal of effort has gone into investigating how the perceived world of conscious awareness is constructed inside the brain. Studies found that when measuring the qualitative features during partial epileptic seizures, patients exhibited an increase in arousal and became absorbed in the experience of the seizure, followed by difficulty in focusing and shifting attention. The most prominent Western proponent of idealism was 18th century empiricist George Berkeley. Van Gulick, R. “Nonreductive Materialism and Intertheoretical Constraint.” In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, J. Kim, eds. [123] Edelman has described this distinction as that of humans possessing higher-order consciousness while sharing the trait of primary consciousness with non-human animals (see previous paragraph). [165] While other conditions may cause a moderate deterioration (e.g., dementia and delirium) or transient interruption (e.g., grand mal and petit mal seizures) of consciousness, they are not included in this category. The dictionary definitions of the word consciousness extend through several centuries and reflect a range of seemingly related meanings, with some differences that have been controversial, such as the distinction between 'inward awareness' and 'perception' of the physical world, or the distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious', or the notion of a "mental entity" or "mental activity" that is not physical. Levine, J. To varying degrees, these views have in common the idea that conscious mental states, in some sense, represent themselves, which then still involves having a thought about a mental state, just not a distinct or separate state. [144], Introspectively, the world of conscious experience seems to have considerable structure. Whatever the merits and exact nature of the argument from transparency (see Kind 2003), it is clear, of course, that not all mental representations are conscious, so the key question eventually becomes: What exactly distinguishes conscious from unconscious mental states (or representations)? In this case, we have introspection which involves a conscious HOT directed at an inner mental state. Introspection is often thought to deliver one's primary knowledge of one's mental life. [42], Although it is widely accepted that Descartes explained the problem cogently, few later philosophers have been happy with his solution, and his ideas about the pineal gland have especially been ridiculed. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of individuals, or persons, acting in the world. Rats are just completely oblivious to calculus problems. Ron Sun and Stan Franklin, Computational models of consciousness: A taxonomy and some examples. Itches, and Newman, J. 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